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Parental Immunity-ITs

EFFECT ON

VicARIous LIABILITY-Sberby

v.

Weather Brothers Transfer Co., Inc.
Parental immunity prohibits a child from instituting a suit against his
parent for a personal tort. 1 However, when a child has sustained injury
as a result of his parent's tortious act committed in the course of his
employment, and the child seeks recovery against his parent's employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the majority of jurisdictions feel that this immunity is purely personal and should not be
extended to the employer.2
Recently the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Maryland
law, was faced with such a situation in the case of Sherby v. Weather
Brothers Tramsfer Co., Inc.3 A child, while riding as a passenger in a
truck operated by the child's father in the scope of his employment,
was injured when the truck was involved in an accident on a Maryland highway. The child sued his father's employer to recover damages
for the parent-employee's negligence. In this case of first impression,
the court disallowed recovery, thereby relegating Maryland to a minority of jurisdictions which have ruled on the point.4
The court based its decision on prior dicta which indicated an adherence by Maryland to the parental immunity doctrine5 and the case
'The doctrine has been followed to some extent by every jurisdiction having an
occasion to rule on the subject. See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1930); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family,
9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956).
2
See Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY S 219 (1957); 2 F. MaCHEm, AGENCY i 1874 (2d
ed. 1914).
3 421 F.2d 1243 (4th Cir. 1970).
4
See Myers v. Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938);
Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 111. App. 164 (1933); Emerson v. Western Seed &
Irr. Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187
S.W.2d 622 (1945). Contra, Mi-Lady Cleaners v. McDaniel, 235 Ala. 469, 179 So. 908
(1938); Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 A. 107 (1930);
Stapleton v. Stapleton, 85 Ga. App. 728, 70 S.E.2d 156 (1952); O'Connor v. Benson
Coal Co., 301 Mass. 145, 16 N.E.2d 636 (1938); Radelicki v. Travis, 39 NJ. Super. 263,
120 A.2d 774 (1956); Schomber v. Tait, 207 Misc. 328, 140 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1955);
Wright v. Wright, 229 N.C. 503, 50 S.E.2d 540 (1948); Koontz v. Messer, 320 Pa.
487, 181 A. 792 (1935); Smith v. Smith, 116 W.Va. 230, 179 S.E. 812 (1935); LeSage v.
LeSage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937).
5 See Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (applying Maryland law);
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18,
152 A. 498 (1930) (parent suing child).
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of Riegger v. Bruton Bre'wing Co.0 In Riegger it was held that a wife
could not recover against her husband's employer in a factual situation
similar to that in Sberby. Due to an employer's right of indemnification 7
against his employee, the court felt that to allow recovery against the
employer would put the ultimate loss upon the husband.8 Since Maryland, despite its Married Woman's Act,9 does not permit a wife to sue
her husband for injuries resulting from his negligence,10 the court refused to permit the wife to do indirectly what she could not do directly.
To add strength to its decision in Riegger, the Maryland court also
adopted a minority view on vicarious liability. It reasoned that an employer's liability is solely derivative, depending entirely upon the liability of his employee.'1 The majority of cases,' 2 however, hold that
when immunity is afforded an employee for his tortious acti culpability, and not liability of the servant, becomes the test of his em13
ployer's liability.
The dissent criticized the analogy drawn by the majority between
Riegger and Sherby and distinguished the two cases on the ground
0 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940).
7

See RE rATEENT Or RESTIUTnoN § 96, comment a at 418 (1937).
Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99 (1940). See Myers v.
Tranquility Irr. Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419 (1938). Contia, Schubert v.
Augtist Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
9 MD. COD, ANm. Art. 45, § 5 (1965).
10 Marxiand has interpreted its Married Woman's Act as having no effect on the
common law rule that a wife cannot maintain an action against her husband for a
personal tort. Furstenberg v. Furstenberg 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
.. ,...
[Lfiability and not culpability is the true basis for the doctrine of respondeat
superior.". Riegger v. Bruton Brewing Co., 178 Md. 518, 16 A.2d 99, 100 (1940). See
Maine v. James Maine & Sons Co., 198 Iowa 1278, 201 N.W. 20 (1924); Riser v. Riser,
240 Mich. 402, 215 N.W. 290 (1927) (overruled on other grounds).
12
See, e.g., Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42, 43
(1928), in which Chief Justice Cardozo stated:
An employer commits a trespass by the hand of his servant upon the person
of another....
A trespass, negligent or willful, upon the person of a wife, does not cease to
be an unlawful act, though the law exempts the husband from liability for the
damage. Others may not hide behind the skirts of his immunity.
Accord, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) o AGENCY § 217, comment b at 470 (1957).
[WJhere the principal directs an agent to act, or the agent acts in the scope of
employment, the fact that the agent has an immunity from liability does not bar
a civil action against the principal."
IsSee, e.g., Schubert v, August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42
(1928).
8
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that at common law a child was not forbidden to sue his parent for a
personal tort,14 whereas, a wife, at common law 5 and under subsequent
Maryland law, 16 could not sue her husband. The dissent then contended
that previous dicta did not necessarily indicate that Maryland would
adopt the doctrine of parental immunity, and therefore the common
law would remain intact. 7 Certainly if this contention were true, the
two cases could readily be distinguished in that immunity would be lacking entirely in Sherby.' A close study of prior cases, however, does
not support the minority's conclusion. In fact, dicta in those cases indicate an adherence to the doctrine of parental immunity. 19
Mere adherence to that doctrine, however, does not preclude recovery by a child against the parent's employer. For the most part,
those jurisdictions allowing recovery by the child do follow the doctrine.2 0 These courts reject the argument adopted in Riegger that the
immunized employee will eventually bear the loss sustained by his
employer is reemployer. The liability of an employee to reimburse his
2
garded as theoretical and only of academic significance. 1
14 See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030 (1930); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS 886 (3d ed. 1964).
15 See McCurdy, Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 ViLI.. L. REv. 303 (1959);
Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956). The inability
of a wife to sue her husband was based on the concept of the legal identity of the
two.

'I See, e.g., Furstenberg v. Furstenberg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927).
17 This argument is based on a modern trend leading away from parental immunity
in certain instances. Although a total abrogation of the doctrine has not yet been
realized, it has been diluted to some extent by certain exceptions. See Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (intentional injury); Worrell v. Worrell, 174
Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (parent acting in vocational, and not parental, capacity).
Little change has been effected on the doctrine in cases involving ordinary negligence
of the parent.
18 If immunity were not afforded the parent-employee, the argument as to an
indirect attack upon the parent would be of no consequence.
19 See cases cited note 5 supra.
20
See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF Tme LAW OF TORTS 890 (3d ed. 1964).
21 See, e.g., Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 170 A.2d 241, 242 (1961), where
the majority held:
The theoretical liability of an employee to reimburse the employer is quite
anachronistic. The rule would surprise the modern employer no less than his
employee. Both expect the employer to save harmless the employee rather
than the other way round, the employer routinely purchasing insurance which
protects the employee as well.
• . . [E]mployers do not in fact seek to pass the burden to their employees.
It would hardly be realistic to assume that employers would alter that policy
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Even if it were to accept, the above rationale as controlling, the
Fourth Circuit would still have been bound to follow Sherby. Maryland, by its earlier adoption of a minority view as to vicarious liability, -2 has closed the door to possible recovery. So long as immunity
exists in favor of the employee, whether parent or husband, the employer escapes liability. The result is anomalous in that it affords absolute immunity to the employer regardless of whether the employee
bears any loss.
M.A.S.

merely because the victim of the business activity happens to be the spouse
[or child] of the employee.
22 See cases cited note 11 supra.

